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The United States Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has been a ver-
satile tool of government since it was created during the Great Depres-
sion. It achieved success with some of its goals and had a terrible record
with others. Its impact on African-American households falls, in many
ways, into the latter category. The FHA began redlining African-American
communities at its very beginning. Its later days have been marred by
high default and foreclosure rates in those same communities.
At the same time, the FHA's overall impact on the housing market has
been immense. Over its lifetime, it has insured more than 40 million mort-
gages, helping to make home ownership available to a broad swath of
American households. And indeed, the FHA mortgage was central to
America's transformation from a nation of renters to homeowners. The
early FHA really created the modern American housing finance system,
as well as the look and feel of post-World War II suburban communities.
Recently, the FHA has come under attack for the poor execution of
some of its policies to expand homeownership, particularly minority
homeownership. Leading commentators have called for the federal gov-
ernment to stop employing the FHA to do anything other than provide li-
quidity to the low end of the mortgage market. These critics' arguments
rely on a couple of examples of programs that were clearly failures, but
they fail to address the FHA's long history of undertaking comparable ini-
tiatives. This Article takes the long view and demonstrates that the FHA
has a history of successfully undertaking new homeownership programs.
At the same time, the Article identifies flaws in the FHA model that
should be addressed in order to prevent them from occurring if the
FHA were to undertake similar initiatives to expand homeownership op-
portunities in the future, particularly for African-American households.
Part I of this Article provides a basic introduction to the FHA and mort-
gage insurance more generally. Part II provides a more textured history of
the FHA, with a particular emphasis on its impact on African-American
communities. Part III describes the divide between two camps of academics,
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whom I divvy up into "Policy Scholars" and "Historians." More particu-
larly, this Article is the first to synthesize the conomics literature regarding
the role that down payments play in the appropriate underwriting of mort-
gages, on the one hand, and the scholarly literature regarding the history of
race and housing policy, on the other, in order to give a more detailed
picture of the federal government's role in housing finance for African-
American households. The article concludes that the FHA can responsibly
promote homeownership in low- and moderate-income communities, not-
withstanding past failures in African-American communities. It ultimately
proposes that FHA homeownership goals should be more explicitly tied
to a rational underwriting process, one that is designed to make sure that
borrowers can afford their mortgages over the long term.
I. The Functions of the FHA
Mortgage insurance is a product that is paid for by the homeowner but
protects the lender if the homeowner defaults on the mortgage. The insurer
pays the lender for the losses that it suffers from any default and foreclo-
sure by the homeowner. The FHA provides insurance guaranteed by the
federal government for mortgage loans for single-family homes and multi-
family buildings. Like much of the federal housing infrastructure, the
FHA has its roots in the Great Depression. It was meant o replace the pri-
vate mortgage insurance (PMI) industry, which was obliterated in the
early 1930s. The PMI industry did not begin to revive until the 1950s.
The FHA's first full year of operation was 1935. The FHA's primary
goals for insuring residential mortgages were to make "a sounder invest-
ment for the lender" and to extend "the practicable range of borrowers
and of home-mortgage loans."' The FHA had many other missions during
the Great Depression as well, ranging from providing liquidity to the
mortgage market, to supporting industries relating to housing, to con-
sumer protection.
Over time, Congress gave the FHA a variety of additional policy man-
dates that were intended to help the federal government achieve other
policy goals. These goals ranged from supporting the war effort during
World War II to increasing the number of minority homeowners during
the early 2000s. Beginning in the 1950s, the FHA's role changed from serv-
ing the entire mortgage market to focusing on certain segments of it. This
changed mission had a major impact on everything the FHA did, includ-
ing how it underwrote mortgage insurance and for whom it did so. The
FHA's patchwork legacy matches its motley history. The next section
demonstrates just how mottled the FHA's mandate has been.
1. FED. Hous. ADMIN., SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRA-
TION 3 (1936) [hereinafter SECOND ANNUAL REPORT].
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II. The FHA's Changing Missions
Congress added and discontinued many missions to the FHA since it
was created in the Great Depression. Depending on the political winds, it
targeted different types of buyers and different types of residences. Some
programs were very successful, and some were abject failures. These initia-
tives, and other important FHA developments from its eighty-plus year his-
tory, are reviewed below.
A. The 1930s: Creation and Execution
Compared to contemporary housing finance reforms, the FHA was set up
fast, efficiently, and with a broad base of support throughout the country-
the very model of a New Deal program.
The FHA Administrator noted after its first full year of operation that
in "most districts of the country, mortgage money frozen almost solid a
year ago, is now generally available to home owners on the most attractive
terms in the history of the Nation."2 The next year, the FHA Administra-
tor found that the freeze had lifted and replaced with the "free flow of
mortgage money from centers of supply into communities where funds
are normally scarce."3
The FHA helped American housing markets to rise from their bottom
by providing more easily accessible credit on terms that were more attrac-
tive than those offered by the private sector. The FHA replaced the private
mortgage insurance companies that had failed in the early 1930s, but it
went far beyond their role in many, many ways.
As told by Kenneth Jackson in his classic book Crabgrass Frontier, the
FHA also had a major negative impact on central cities and minority com-
munities from its very beginning.4 Its impact on the former was uninten-
tional. Because the FHA made financing available for so much new hous-
ing, massive numbers of white working-class families fled the cities to the
newly built suburbs.
But the impact on minority households was quite intentional: the FHA
reflected the widely held prejudices and discriminatory practices already
endemic in the all-white housing and mortgage-lending industries. One of
the main such practices was the imposition of restrictive covenants that
excluded African-Americans and other minorities from white communi-
ties. The FHA also drew red lines on its underwriting maps to cordon
off blocks in which even a single non-white family lived. Such "redlined"
blocks were not eligible for FHA-insured mortgages. The end result of
such redlining was massive disinvestment in cities with large black pop-
ulations. Older cities of the Northeast, like Camden, New Jersey, were
2. Id. at vii.
3. Id. at vi.
4. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 203-18 (1985).
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particularly hard hit.5 The link between bureaucratic redlining and the de-
cline of cities was not fully made until the 1960s, at which point many of
the affected cities had become shadows of their former selves.6
By 1937, the FHA "participated in 45% of all housing starts in the
United States. From 1935 to 1939, FHA-insured loans accounted for 23%
of all single-family mortgage lending, including refinance loans."7 Conser-
vative underwriting meant that in 1940, lenders had foreclosed on less
than four-tenths of 1% of those FHA-insured mortgages originated in
the 1930s. The FHA's first few years seemed to be an unvarnished success
as a government response to the liquidity crisis in the mortgage market
brought about by the Great Depression, although its corrosive effects on
cities and African-American communities were just getting started.
B. The 1940s: War Housing
The FHA, as with the rest of the nation, transitioned from responding
to the Great Depression to responding to the exigencies imposed by
World War II. For the FHA, this meant helping to house defense industry
workers and their families.8 At the same time, the FHA sought to "encour-
age production of new homes for families in income classifications which
were not considered as feasible markets for new homes under the previ-
ous systems of home financing."9 FHA market share increased to 45% by
1944. As World War II ended, the FHA turned its attention from war mo-
bilization to the needs of returning veterans and their families.
The VA mortgage-guarantee program was created in 1944 as part of the
"GI Bill." The VA did not require down payments "on the theory that sol-
diers weren't paid enough to accumulate savings."10 The VA market share
peaked in 1947 at almost 28%,11 and this peak was matched by a decline in
the FHA market share.1 2
In 1948, the FHA made an important change that is now integral to our
notion of the American mortgage: it increased the maximum term for an
5. Id. at 213.
6. Id. at 214-15.
7. Dan Immergluck, From Minor to Major Player: The Geography of FHA Lending
During the U.S. Mortgage Crisis, 33 J. URB. AFF. 1, 4 (2011).
8. FED. Hous. ADMIN., EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINIS-
TRATION 3 (1942), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015005860161.
9. FED. Hous. ADMIN., SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINIS-
TRATION 17 (1941), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015005860161.
10. Michael S. Carliner, Development of Federal Homeownership "Policy," 9 Hous.
POL'Y DEBATE 299, 308 (1998).
11. Dwight M. Jaffee & John M. Quigley, Housing Policy, Mortgage Policy, and the
Federal Housing Administration, MEASURING AND MANAGING FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISK
106 (Deborah Lucas ed., 2010).
12. Immergluck, supra note 7, at 1, 6.
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FHA mortgage to thirty years.1 3 Extraordinarily, nearly one-third of "new
nonfarm residential construction (including rental housing as well as
small homes)" received financing through the FHA's war housing insur-
ance program by 1948.14
Prior to 1948, legally enforceable restrictions based on race, ethnicity,
and religion were common among private property owners. Even more,
the federal government actively encouraged such restrictions through a
variety of methods, including underwriting decisions of the FHA.s The
Supreme Court rejected this form of discrimination in the landmark
case of Shelley v. Kraemer in 1948.16 Soon after Shelley, the FHA amended
its rules to bar insurance for homes for which covenants "restricting the
use or occupancy of the property on the basis of race, creed, or color"
were to be recorded prior to the recordation of the FHA-insured mort-
gage." Notwithstanding this clear statement of the law, the FHA contin-
ued to informally support the use of racially restrictive covenants for
years after Shelley was decided. This support was true even though the
Truman administration revised the FHA's Underwriting Manual in 1949
to include equal opportunity standards because very little actually chan-
ged in practice.
The FHA continued in its role as a mainstay in the single-family hous-
ing market. The FHA had more than a third of the mortgage market at the
beginning of the 1950s, and the VA had an additional 13%.19 Its under-
writing remained conservative: 0.04% of mortgages in 1950 were in pro-
cess of foreclosure in the FHA's primary one-to-four family program
(the Section 203 program).2 0
13. Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical
and International Context, 19 J. EcoN. PERSP. 93, 96 (2005).
14. FED. Hous. ADMIN., FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING AD-
MINISTRATION 11 (1947), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?seq=349;id=mdp.
39015082064 752;page=root;view=lup;size=100;orient=0;17;num=117.
15. See, e.g., FED. Hous. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL para. 980(3)g (1938) ("Rec-
ommended restrictions should include provision for the following: ... Probation of
the occupancy of properties except by the race for which they are intended.").
16. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
17. FED. Hous. ADMIN., SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINIS-
TRATION 3 (1949), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?seq=647;id=mdp.390150820647.
52;page=root;view=lup;size=100;orient=0;num=11 (stating that the ban applied to
covenants recorded after February 15, 1950).
18. FED. Hous. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL para. 242 (1955).
19. Immergluck, supra note 7, at 6.
20. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., 1968 HUD STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 117 (1968),
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=ucl.32106016148535; view=lup;seq=7.
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C. The 1950s: The Maturation of the American Mortgage
Like an episode of Mad Men, the FHA offered a glittery, new world to
whites and a gritty and impoverished one to blacks. The quality of hous-
ing for white households improved ramatically in the 1950s. Black
households, however, continued to suffer from a variety of discriminatory
policies, including redlining by the FHA.
FHA mortgages in the 1950s began to look very much like FHA mort-
gages that would later be offered in the 2000s. For instance in 1950, Con-
gress allowed some loans to have lower down payments than previously
authorized, as little as 5%.21 In 1957, the minimum down payment was
lowered to 3% in some cases.2 2
The 1950s also brought another significant change to the housing sector.
States, with the memory of the failures of the Great Depression growing
dim, began passing laws to allow private mortgage insurance companies
to form. However, this private alternative remained a small competitor to
the FHA until the 1980s.
The FHA began to loosen underwriting requirements in the middle of
the 1950s, and defaults increased as well. This loosening was reflected in
part by the amendment o the Housing Act of 1954, which replaced "eco-
nomic soundness" as the guideline for the FHA's main insurance fund to
"acceptable risk." 23 This amendment was a harbinger of even looser un-
derwriting standards to come. These looser standards would have an out-
sized impact on the housing stock in older cities.
The FHA's performance reflected the changes in its underwriting pol-
icies. Default rates for the primary single-family insurance program, Sec-
tion 203, were 0.83% of the mortgages in force in 1960. Foreclosure rates
21. Housing Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-475, § 104(a), 64 Stat. 48, 51-52
(amended 1950).
22. Housing Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-104, §101, 71 Stat. 294, 295 (amending
section 203(b) of the National Housing Act of 1934) (also setting higher maximum
loan amounts for three and four family homes).
23. See FED. Hous. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL para. 101 (1936) (noting that
the National Housing Act provided "that no mortgage shall be accepted for insur-
ance unless it is economically sound"). The Housing Act of 1954 introduced the
concept of "acceptable risk." Pub. L. No. 83-560, 68 Stat. 590 § 110 (amending sec-
tion 203 of the National Housing Act such that if the FHA Commissioner "finds
that the project with respect to which the mortgage is executed is an acceptable
risk, giving consideration to the need for providing adequate housing for families
of low and moderate income particularly in suburban and outlying areas or small
communities," the Commissioner may insure mortgages that otherwise comply
with the FHA requirements).
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for the Section 203 program by 1960 were 0.23% of mortgages in force,
roughly triple the previous decade.2 4 Change was afoot.
D. The 1960s: Housing in the Urban Core
Over its first thirty years of operation, the FHA helped to finance about a
fifth of all newly constructed housing, most of it in the suburbs. However,
as of 1967, only 3% of all new homes were sold to African-Americans.2 5 But
as with the rest of society, the ferment over segregation, civil rights, and
economic inequality were the major historical themes of the 1960s for the
FHA too. Each of these themes was clearly reflected in the FHA's opera-
tions and its role in the housing markets, for both good and ill.
Beginning in the 1950s and continuing into the 1960s, Congress added a
number of innovative insurance programs to the FHA's stable. They in-
cluded insurance programs for urban renewal, new forms of homeowner-
ship like condominiums and cooperatives, and housing for seniors and
the disabled.2 6 In 1962, President Kennedy reversed the FHA's redlining
policy that had been in effect since its inception,2 7 and the FHA began
to embark on a change of focus to supporting low- and moderate-income
homeownership as well as minority homeownership. In 1965, the FHA be-
came a part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) Office of Housing.
Notwithstanding the addition of these new programs, FHA market
share declined in the 1960s. By 1964, PMI provider Mortgage Guaranty In-
surance Corporation had eleven competitors. As PMI was growing, the
FHA was also acknowledging significant operating difficulties, such as
delays in processing applications.
In response to the civil unrest of the mid-1960s, President Johnson ap-
pointed the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, popularly
known as the Kerner Commission. The Kerner Commission found that
residential segregation and unequal housing opportunities were a major
cause of civil unrest in cities. In particular, it found that
Federal programs have been able to do comparatively little to provide
housing for the disadvantaged. In the 31-year history of subsidized Federal
housing, only about 800,000 units have been constructed, with recent pro-
duction averaging about 50,000 units a year. By comparison, over a period
24. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., 1977 HUD STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 95 tbl.19
(1977), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=ucl.32106016648039;num=121;seq=
121;view=lup.
25. WENDELL E. PRITCHETT, ROBERT CLIFTON WEAVER AND THE AMERICAN CITY: THE
LIFE AND TIMES OF AN URBAN REFORMER 312 (2008).
26. Anthony Pennington-Cross & Anthony M. Yezer, The Federal Housing Ad-
ministration in the New Millennium, 11 J. Hous. RES. 357, 359 (2000).
27. Carliner, supra note 10, at 299, 307.
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only 3 years longer, FHA insurance guarantees have made possible the con-
struction of over 10 million middle and upper income units.28
In response to this historical inequity, Congress determined that many
of the FHA's new programs would have a very different underwriting
model than the traditional one. These newer programs typically targeted
"underserved borrowers," such as households of color.2 9 They were
also subsidized by the federal government. The FHA's core single-family
Section 203(b) program, in contrast, had lower-risk homeowners cross-
subsidize higher-risk homeowners.
One such initiative that Congress enacted in 1968, the Section 235
homeownership program, was seen at he time as giving the FHA "an op-
portunity to overcome its image as an anti-poor, anti-minority Govern-
ment agency."s0 The program was also seen as having great potential
by a wide variety of groups, including those "representing business as
well as social welfare concerns."31 This move away from conservative un-
derwriting led to rapidly increasing foreclosure rates and ultimately
wreaked much havoc in the early 1970s. This havoc is embodied in the
poorly executed Section 235 program, described in greater detail below.
Defaults and foreclosures rose again during the 1960s. Total defaults
for Section 203 in 1970 were 1.69% of mortgages in force.3 2 Foreclosures
in process for Section 203 in 1970 were 0.52% of mortgages in force,
more than doubling the rate of the previous decade.3 3 These were signifi-
cant increases from the 1950s.
E. The 1970s: Spectacular Failure
By the early 1970s, the dreams of the 60s were replaced with the hang-
overs induced by the Vietnam War, inflation, recession, and continuous
civil rights struggles. By this time, the FHA "acquired a deserved reputa-
tion for confining its service mostly to white, middle class, suburban home
buyers."34 Notwithstanding this failing, the American homeownership
rate increased from roughly 44% in 1940 to about 63% in 1970, and the
FHA was partially responsible for this increase.3 ' The FHA's mortgage
28. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 13 (1968).
29. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON Hous., THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
HouSING 163-64 (1982), http://huduser.org/portal//Publications/pdf/HUD-2460.
pdf.
30. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HOME OWNERSHIP FOR LOWER INCOME FAMILIES A RE-
PORT ON THE RACIAL AND ETHNIC IMPACT OF THE SECTION 235 PROGRAM 77 (1971).
31. Id. at 7.
32. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., 1979 HUD STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 113 tbl.21,
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=ucl.32106006213851;seq=133;view=lup;
num=113.
33. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., supra note 24, at 95 tbl.19.
34. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 77.
35. LAWRENCE L. THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF HUD 3 (2006).
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origination share (by dollar volume) reached a new high in 1970, at about
a quarter of the market. This share accounted for nearly 30% of all single-
family loans." This large share was due to a variety of factors, including
the acceleration of the new Section 235 program with its subsidized inter-
est rates at the same time that unsubsidized interest rates were reaching
new highs. In its first four years, the Section 235 program helped to fi-
nance homes for about 400,000 low- and moderate-income families.17 Sec-
tion 235 homebuyers had to make only tiny down payments.
In 1973, the Section 235 program was suspended because so many of its
mortgages were going into default and foreclosure. The program was termi-
nated a few years later.38 Moreover, many of the homes sold through the pro-
gram were sold by predators who covered up structural problems with
sheetrock and paint and sold them to unsophisticated low- and moderate-
income buyers.3 9 Once the structural problems surfaced, many of these
households could not afford to repair them, and the homes went into default.
Entire blocks in some cities were lined with boarded-up homes that had been
financed pursuant to Section 235.40
Section 235 represented a low point for the FHA with more than 200
people convicted for abuses arising from the program.4 1 The federal gov-
ernment lost over $2 billion on mortgages that ended up in foreclosure
during this period.42 The Section 235 fiasco "was one of the major reasons
for the moratorium on subsidized housing programs declared in 1973."43
If the broader dreams of equality of the 1960s were dashed in the 1970s,
so were the dreams of an effective FHA. At the same time the Section 235
fiasco was unfolding, the FHA was rocked by a series of scandals.4 4
36. Immergluck, supra note 7, at 6.
37. Carliner, supra note 10, at 313.
38. BRENT D. RYAN, DESIGN AFTER DECLINE: How AMERICA REBUILDS SHRINKING CITIES
92 (2012).
39. ROBERT VAN ORDER & ANTHONY YEZER, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY CTR.
FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN ANALYSIS, FHA ASSESSMENT REPORT: THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL
HOUSING ADMINISTRATION IN A RECOVERING U.S. HOUSING MARKET 9 (2011), http://
business.gwu.edu/files/ffia-assessment-report-06-2011.pdf.
40. THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 3.
41. RYAN, supra note 38. See also KEVIN Fox, GOTHAM, RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND UN-
EVEN DEVELOPMENT: THE KANSAS CITY EXPERIENCE, 1990-2000 145 (2002) (noting that
private real estate brokers, home builders, mortgage lenders, and FHA appraisers
were convicted for abusing the FHA program).
42. RYAN, supra note 38, at 93.
43. VAN ORDER & YEZER, supra note 39.
44. See, e.g., John Herbers, U.S. Report Finds Fraud in Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
1971, at 1, http://www.nytimes.com/1971/01/06/archives/us-report-finds-
fraud-in-housing-cites-wide-abuse-in-federal-home.html?_r=0 (reporting on a
study by the House Banking and Currency Committee that found the FHA
"allowed speculators to make huge profits at the expense of the poor in what
amounted to 'sheer fraud'"); Former FHA Chief in Philadelphia Named in 2 U.S.
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Indeed, HUD Secretary George Romney called for the FHA to be privat-
ized in 1972, in part because of problems in the agency and in part because
of the return of the PMI industry.
During the early 1970s, the mortgage insurance sector was subject to
big swings in market share between the FHA and private mortgage insur-
ers. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac set the stage for a revival of the PMI
industry in the early 1970s as they sought to purchase high-LTV (loan-
to-value) mortgages. Because their charters required that the high-LTV
mortgages have mortgage insurance, private mortgage insurers had a
steady stream of business.
Underwriting stabilized toward the end of the 1970s. In 1978, default
rates for the Section 203 program had lowered to 0.89% of mortgages in
force, from 1.69% of mortgages in force in 1970.45 Foreclosures in process
by 1978 for the Section 203 program were 0.30% of mortgages in force, a
meaningful decline from the rate at the end of the previous decade.4 6
F. The 1980s: PMI Is Back!
Even before Gordon Gekko pronounced that greed is good,4 7 skepti-
cism for that government instrumentality, the FHA, blossomed during
the Reagan years. At the beginning of the decade, the FHA and VA had
about 20% of the market (by dollar amount) for new mortgages, and the
PMI industry had about the same market share.48 The FHA's express mis-
sion also changed from its original one of serving a broad swath of home-
owners to one of particularly serving lower-income households.4 9 This
transition was not untroubled, as FHA loans continued to be at the root
of big problems in urban communities.
Although the FHA had turned away from its history of racial discrimi-
nation, its record of success in communities of color was decidedly mixed.
In many ways, this disconnect was a problem of underwriting. FHA un-
derwriting went from being prejudicially restrictive for households of
color in its early years to being irrationally loose in its later years. The
FHA had still not come up with any sort of approach to its underwriting
that balanced access to credit and sustainability of credit. This failure
Indictments, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1972, at 2 (reporting that the former director of the
Philadelphia FHA had been indicted on multiple counts of taking bribes and tax
evasions); Monroe W. Karmen, Restoring Cities After the Scandals, WALL ST. J.,
July 5, 1972, at 8 (describing the failure of programs in urban areas).




47. Stanley Weiser & Oliver Stone, Wall Street (1987).
48. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON Hous., supra note 29, at 163.
49. See Jaffee & Quigley, supra note 11, at 108 (describing the shift towards
lower-income borrowers).
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continued to plague the FHA and the communities it served decades after
it rejected its early discriminatory practices.
The FHA faced something of an identity crisis in the early 1980s. Pres-
ident Reagan created a Commission on Housing to study the FHA and
other aspects of the housing sector. The Commission believed that the
FHA should cede much of its market to the PMI industry, which had re-
covered by then. By 1980, the PMI industry had grown to fourteen firms,
which had insured 31% of the entire mortgage market.5 0 The industry was
arguing that FHA had become unnecessary. Indeed, the Reagan Adminis-
tration even batted around a proposal to privatize it.51 At the same time,
the FHA's market share began falling to very low levels, as low as 5% by
the mid-1980s.52
The late 1980s told a completely different story as the PMI industry
faced heavy losses from riskier products such as adjustable-rate mort-
gages (ARMs) and from depressed housing prices in the Farm Belt and
the Southwest.53 Some PMI companies merged with better-capitalized
ones. One of the fourteen was not even able to fully repay its policyhold-
ers.54 By the late 1980s, the FHA (as well as the VA) came roaring back,
with a roughly 60% market share of insured loans, leaving the PMI indus-
try with 40%.ss Much like the Terminator, played by Arnold Schwarze-
negger in the Reagan-era movie, the private mortgage insurance industry
was already prepared to say, "I'll be back!" 6
During the late 1980s, the FHA's delinquency and foreclosure rates
were about twice those for conventional loans. Reflecting its changing
mission, the FHA began keeping statistics on the number of mortgages
going to first-time homebuyers. By 1991, 58% of FHA single-family in-
sured mortgages went to first-time homebuyers.5 7
50. BRUCE E. FOOTE & PAMELA HAIRSTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-421, RAISING THE
FHA MORTGAGE LIMIT: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 7 (1998), http://www.cq.com/graphics/
crsreports/98-421_1998-11-03.pdf.
51. Robert Pear, Reagan Proposes Selling off F.H.A. to Private Bidder, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/14/us/reagan-proposes-
selling-off-ffia-to-private-bidder.html.
52. Immergluck, supra note 7, at 6.
53. Eric N. Berg, Upheaval at Mortgage Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1988, http://
www. nytimes.com/1988/03/03/business/upheaval-at-mortgage-insurers.html.
54. PROMONTORY FIN. GRP., LLC., THE ROLE OF PRIVATE MORTGAGE INSURANCE IN THE
U.S. HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM 4, http://usmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/
622-Genworth-Study-I-Role-of-PMI.pdf.
55. Berg, supra note 53.
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G. The 1990s: The FHA Goes Down with a Whimper
As the Soviet Union collapsed in the face of triumphant capitalism, the
FHA looked as if it would collapse in the face of a resurgent PMI industry.
The FHA arrived in the 1990s with the legacy of high default rates and a
variety of other problems. The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable
Housing Act of 199058 mandated more conservative underwriting stan-
dards for mortgages and the FHA's insurance funds. The FHA's share
of the mortgage market continued to face serious competition from the
PMI industry. Over much of the decade, the FHA and the PMI industry
each had a share of the total mortgage market hat was measured in the
teens.
By the late 1990s, the nine remaining private mortgage insurers in-
sured about the same number of mortgages as the FHA and the VA com-
bined and more than twice the dollar amount of mortgage debt than the
FHA and the other government insurance programs combined. And it
looked as though the PMI industry had nowhere to go but up: the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that a third of the
FHA's 1995 portfolio would have been eligible for PMI.5 9
During the late 1990s, the FHA's delinquency and foreclosure rates
were often more, and sometimes much more, than three times as high
as those for conventional loans. 0 In 2000, the principal amount of FHA
mortgages was about three-fourths the size of that of PMI mortgages.
These differences reflected the market segmentation of the two, with the
FHA having a bigger share of low- and moderate-income households.
Starting in the late 1990s, subprime mortgage lenders offered terms that
appeared better than those offered by FHA lenders. As a result, many
households left the FHA market and entered into the subprime market.
Subprime mortgages turned out to be much worse for homeowners
than they seemed at the time. For instance, borrowers were given low in-
terest rates that lasted for short periods of a couple of years or even a few
months before shooting up so much that payments became unaffordable.
This would have a big negative impact on homeowners, particularly those
in African-American communities, in the 2000s.
H. The 2000s: The FHA Goes Boom!
Good times in the booming financial markets of the early 2000s meant
lean times for the FHA. While the mortgage market was heating up overall,
the FHA's share of mortgage originations by dollar volume fell from its
58. Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 332, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990).
59. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-96-123, HOMEOWNERSHIP: FHA's ROLE
IN HELPING PEOPLE OBTAIN HOME MORTGAGES 4 (1996), http://www.goa.gov/
archive/1996/rc96123.pdf.
60. MARSHALL W. DENNIS & THOMAS J. PINKOWISH, RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDING:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 156, tbl. 8-1 (5th ed. 2004).
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1970 peak of roughly 25% to its 2006 trough of less than 2%.61 This long-
term decline had begun in earnest in 1996 and was most pronounced
among minority borrowers who were moving over to the private-label sub-
prime market that was dramatically loosening its underwriting standards
and offering extremely attractive teaser rates as well.62 Before this subprime
boom, the FHA's low-down-payment mortgages and less stringent credit
score requirements had meant that the FHA had a larger market share in
those communities that had been underrepresented among homeowners.
During this same period, the FHA decided to originate loans with down pay-
ments funded by sellers that were channeled through various not-for-profit
organizations.6 3 Such loans were no-down-payment loans by another name,
as the third party paid the down payment, leaving the borrower with no skin
in the game. These loans, unsurprisingly, defaulted at very high rates.
The national homeownership rate peaked in the mid-2000s at about
69%.64 The FHA was part of that dramatic expansion. For instance, about
80% of FHA-insured purchases were first-time homebuyers in 2001.' But
61. Jaffee & Quigley, supra note 11, at 106.
62. See David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory
Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 997 (2006)
("Communities of color have been disproportionately represented in the subprime
market in contrast to their representation in the prime market. African-Americans
and Hispanics combined made up less than 8% of the prime home purchase mort-
gage market in 1998, but such borrowers made up nearly 20% of subprime home
purchase mortgage market in that same year. Similarly, African-American and His-
panic borrowers together make up about 6% of all prime conventional refinance
mortgages and 17% of subprime refinance mortgages. And more than half of all
loans in predominantly African-American communities are subprime, compared
to only 9% of loans in predominantly white communities.").
63. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE FI-
NANCIAL STATUS OF THE FHA MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND 11 (2009), http://
www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/rmra/oe/rpts/actr/2009actr-subltr.pdf. With a
typical seller-funded down payment transaction, the seller gives a third party an
amount equal to the buyer's down payment. The third party then gives the
funds to the buyer who uses it for a down payment. This structure allowed the
parties to avoid legal limitations on seller-paid down payments. See generally
Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-24, MORTGAGE FINANCING: ADDITIONAL ACTION
NEEDED TO MANAGE RISKS OF FHA-INSURED LOANS WITH DOWN PAYMENT ASSISTANCE
3-6 (2005) (noting that HUD does not monitor the use of seller-funded down
payment loans and recommending more routine monitoring). Unsurprisingly,
the purchase price typically accounted for the seller-funded down payment by
selling for 2% to 3% more than similar homes sold without seller-funded down
payments. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1033T, MORTGAGE FINANCING:
SELLER-FUNDED DOWN-PAYMENT ASSISTANCE CHANGES THE STRUCTURE OF THE PURCHASE
TRANSACTION AND NEGATIVELY AFFECTS LOAN PERFORMANCE 3 (2007).
64. THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 14 fig.1.6.
65. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., FHA ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT FISCAL YEAR
2001, at 7 (2001).
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the FHA's success with communities of color, since the rejection of its
explicitly discriminatory practices, remained decidedly mixed. Although
African-American homeownership had increased significantly since the
FHA's creation, it was stuck about twenty percentage points behind the na-
tional rate in 2006, as was the rate for Hispanic households.
The FHA's competitors were themselves lowering down payment re-
quirements to as little as zero. The FHA responded by in some cases offer-
ing insurance for financing of nearly 100% of the sales price.6 6 PMI had
62% of the mortgage insurance market by the mid-2000s.67 At the same
time, subprime lenders pushed the envelope, offering mortgages with
flexible payment and variable interest options that were particularly at-
tractive to purchasers in areas with rapidly rising prices. Some mortgage
insurers were going so far as to underwrite loans with LTVs of 100% and
even 103%, in order to cover closing costs too.68
In response to changes in the industry, and to further expand homeow-
nership, Congress enacted the American Dream Downpayment Act of
2003.69 This new program gave first-time homeowners up to $10,000 as
a down payment. This program, like the 1970s' Section 235 program,
was an unmitigated failure for homeowners and a financial catastrophe
for the FHA. Once again, a no-down-payment loan program failed.7 0
That being said, "with the exception of the years during the subprime
boom," the 203(b) program, the FHA's primary mortgage insurance pro-
gram for single family homes, "served as the major source of mortgage fi-
nancing for first-time, low-income and minority homebuyers."7 1
HUD continued to scramble to respond to the changes in the market,
proposing to Congress a variety of long-due reforms in 2006. Echoing
the FHA's consumer protection goals from the Great Depression, Con-
gress passed the Expanding Homeownership Act of 2007 to help FHA
modernize, "to make government-insured loan products competitive
with the private sector and make available affordable housing to more
Americans .. .72 In particular, this modernized FHA was intended to
66. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-708, FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION:
MODERNIZATION PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE PROGRAM AND BUDGET IMPLICATIONS AND RE-
QUIRE CONTINUED IMPROVEMENTS IN RISK MANAGEMENT 9, 20-21, 27 (2007), http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d07708.pdf.
67. DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 60, at 178.
68. Id.
69. American Dream Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 108-186, 117 Stat. 2685
(2003).
70. VAN ORDER & YEZER, supra note 39, at 8.
71. ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL AND CTR. FOR RESPON-
SIBLE LENDING RESEARCH 2012, BALANCING RISK AND ACCESS: UNDERWRITING STANDARDS
FOR QUALIFIED RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES 6.
72. GINNIE MAE, REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 11, http://www.
ginniemae.gov/about/ann rep/ReportToCongress07.pdf.
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"provide a safe, fair, and affordable FHA alternative to the subprime mar-
ket."" Not incidentally, the legislation also allowed the FHA to reduce the
minimum 3% down payment requirement. These efforts to compete with
the private sector on its terms turned out to be a big mistake.
Events soon overtook Congress as the FHA's dramatic loss of market
share was soon to be matched by an equally dramatic rise. Once the sub-
prime crisis hit, government-insured mortgages absorbed an extraordi-
nary level of demand for mortgages as the private-label (non-conforming
subprime and jumbo) sector shriveled to next to nothing.
By 2008, the FHA and the VA had a market share of all mortgage orig-
inations of more than 20%. Congress significantly raised the loan limits
that the FHA could insure to provide liquidity to a wider swath of the
mortgage market. The FHA's market share continued to explode as capital
from other sources in the residential mortgage market dried up. By 2010, it
was 30% overall and nearly 40% for home purchases. The FHA's role in
home purchases for minorities during this period was even greater: 60%
of all African-American and Latino purchasers had FHA-insured mort-
gages. This homeownership rate was nearly an exponential increase
from 2005 and 2006 where 10% of African-American and just 6% of His-
panic purchasers had FHA loans. More broadly, the FHA had "become
the primary lender to borrowers with down payments of less than 20 per-
cent, lifting its share of mortgage originations to nearly 20 percent" in
2010.74 The FHA had filled the gap left by the implosion of the subprime
industry.
This dramatic increase in market share was soon followed by an
equally dramatic increase in defaults and foreclosures on FHA mortgages.
This poor performance resulted from ill-conceived programs, such as the
American Dream Downpayment initiative, as well as from the general
meltdown of the housing markets in the late 2000s. As a result, it was ex-
pected that the FHA's massive fund that ensured Section 203 mortgages
was "unlikely to meet its statutory capital requirements by the end of "
the 2009 fiscal year.7' It soon appeared that the fund was in great distress,
with "[aill of the annual books-of-business from 2000 through 2008 are ex-
pected to result in net losses over the life of the loan guarantees, but the
largest losses will be from the 2004-2008 books."6 The FHA ultimately
73. Id.
74. JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES, HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING
2013, at 10 (2013).
75. Michael Goldberg & Ann Schnare, An Update on the Capital Adequacy of the
FHA Single Family Insurance Program 1 (2009), http: / /ssrn.com/abstract=1510387.
76. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE Fi-
NANCIAL STATUS OF THE FHA MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND FISCAL YEAR 2010, at
23 (2010), http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/rmra/oe/rpts/actr/2010actr subltr.
pdf.
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recovered because of an improving housing market, higher premiums,
and better underwriting, but the FHA was now at a new low.
While the FHA was riding this rollercoaster, the PMI industry was on
one of its own. The industry peaked in 2003 and then shrank dramatically
as a result of the subprime crisis. As the housing markets recovered, so
did the PMI industry, but it was not able to support the housing market
during the crisis in the way that the government-backed FHA was able to.
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 barred the FHA from
insuring mortgages in transactions involving seller-financed down pay-
ment assistance, which was at the root of so much of the FHA's massive
losses in the 2000s.77 It also increased the minimum down payment to
3.5%.17 And it began tightening its underwriting. Finally, Congress autho-
rized the FHA in 2010 to raise its premiums, which also helped to stabilize
its financial health.
For the years 2006-2012, the FHA's losses as a percent of its total debt
outstanding was 17.3%, much higher than Fannie and Freddie's 3.9%, but
a bit lower than the private-label MBS sector's 20.3%.79 The FHA contin-
ued to serve first-time and lower-income homebuyers, consistent with
its change in focus in its later years. In fiscal year 2011, "75 percent of
FHA purchase-loan endorsements were first-time homebuyers, which
[was] a 5 percent decline from fiscal year 2010."so And in 2011, 59.2% of
its insured borrowers were classified as low/moderate income, again re-
flecting the mission of the modern FHA.
I. The 2010s: The Reckoning
As the financial crisis recedes from memory, the FHA is hailed in he-
roic terms for expanding so rapidly in the face of the retreat of private cap-
ital from the mortgage market. It is also pilloried so mightily for the mas-
sive losses it suffered because of its loose underwriting in the early 2000s.
These losses resulted in the FHA's first bailout in its eighty-year history.
The FHA began to tighten its underwriting standards after its defaults
began to rise. Because of its poor financial position, the FHA also raised its
premiums. The financial condition of the FHA's fund that insured Sec-
tion 203 program mortgages had been poor since 2009, when it failed to
meet its required 2% minimum capital ratio.
PMI began to make a comeback in 2010 when it insured 4.3% of all new
mortgages. By 2013, its market share grew to 11.3%. The FHA continued
77. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 2113,
122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (amending section 203(b)(9) of the National Housing Act).
78. Id.
79. Jonathan R. Laing, Fannie, Freddie: On Borrowed Time, BARRON'S, July 29, 2013.
80. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., FHA ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT FISCAL YEAR
2011, at 8 (2011), http: / /portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=ffiafyl
lannualmg mntrpt.pdf.
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to focus on first-time homebuyers. In 2012, about 78% of its loans went to
that population and about 32% went to households of color.
This history of the FHA accomplishes a number of goals. First, it dem-
onstrates, contrary to conventional wisdom, that the FHA's mission was
actually many missions from its very start. Second, it demonstrates,
again contrary to conventional wisdom, that the FHA added and shed
missions over the years, some of which were big successes while others
were big failures. Thus, critics' calls for a return to the FHA's "original"
mission misread its history. Third, it demonstrates the FHA's ability to re-
spond rapidly to systemic failure in the housing finance market, particu-
larly when compared with the PMI industry. Fourth, it documents the
FHA's very troubled history of discrimination as well as misguided at-
tempts to remedy past discrimination. Finally, it demonstrates the impor-
tance of responsible underwriting to the FHA's success, however one
chooses to measure it.
The FHA has an important part to play in the mortgage market, but
that part is not so clear, given its history. It is clear, though, that the
PMI industry is not capable of assuming all of the roles played by the
FHA. The next section addresses the scholarly debate over the future of
the FHA and demonstrates that, in large part, the debate is over the
FHA's mixed legacy in African-American communities and what we
can learn from that legacy.
III. The Scholarly Debate Regarding the FHA's Legacy
The FHA is an understudied topic despite having a massive impact on
the built environment of the United States. This lack of scholarship is par-
ticularly unfortunate because the FHA has had some serious failures that
mar its long history of success as a provider of liquidity, stability, and ac-
cess to the residential mortgage market. Because of those failures, the
leading contemporary commentators on the FHA have panned its initia-
tives to encourage homeownership. The absence of a vibrant scholarly ex-
change regarding the FHA stands in the way of responsibly charting its
future course.
The scholarly literature that does exist can be roughly divided into two
camps. I will refer to the first camp as the "Policy Scholars." The Policy
Scholars, with backgrounds in economics, finance, and accounting, are
mostly concerned with the future direction of the FHA. I will refer to
the second camp as the "Historians." The Historians have backgrounds
in history and sociology. They are generally concerned with the FHA's
track record.
Both groups find a lot to criticize about the FHA. After reviewing their
findings, I will take a middle way that accounts for both critiques but
charts a way forward for the FHA that can produce good policy results.
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A. The Policy Scholars
Mostly writing after the Great Recession, the Policy Scholars have
highlighted the harms that the FHA has suffered as a result of loose
underwriting standards. Indeed, these harms had to be measured in
the billions of dollars as the FHA absorbed the biggest losses in its his-
tory. Following these losses, the Policy Scholars would impose some
stark changes on the FHA, changes that would reduce the risk of big
losses but also reduce the FHA's ability to expand the rate of homeow-
nership going forward.
Robert Van Order and Anthony Yezer, the authors of the FHA Assess-
ment Report, write that "the lesson that we should take away from" the
FHA's recent history of looser underwriting standards is that the "FHA,
as currently organized, should not be used as an experimental program
to encourage homeownership."s" However, they further note that this ap-
proach is nonetheless unavoidable because "there are powerful political
forces willing to push FHA to allow very unsound lending practices."8 2
Given that Yezer is the co-author of one of the handful of comprehensive
studies of the FHA, this is a damning assessment indeed." Housing econ-
omist Joseph Gyourko is more succinct, but equally pessimistic: the FHA
"has failed by any reasonable metric."8 4
The few policy analysts who make a close study of the FHA agree in the
main with Yezer and the other scholars who have given the FHA their sus-
tained attention. The American Enterprise Institute's Edward Pinto, the au-
thor of the FHA Watch,8 writes that "[glovernment insurance programs
suffer from three fundamental flaws: (1) the government cannot success-
fully price for risk; (2) government backing distorts prices, resource alloca-
tion, and competition; and (3) political pressure and congressional de-
mands for a quid pro quo inevitably arise, politicizing the programs."86
Much data exists to support these characterizations of the FHA, but the
Policy Scholars cherry-pick from the historical record to make their case,
focusing on disastrous policies of the early 1970s and the 2000s. By failing
to address the FHA's other initiatives over its eighty years of operation,
they fail to make a convincing case that the FHA's history is a tale of failed
government action.
The Policy Scholars all advocate a return to the more conservative
underwriting that characterized the FHA's early years. They do not
81. VAN ORDER & YEZER, supra note 39, at 9.
82. Id.
83. Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 26, at 357358.
84. JOSEPH GYOURKO, AM. ENTER. INST., RETHNKNG THE FHA iii (2013).
85. EDWARD J. PINTO, FHA WATCH, https://www.aei.org/tag/ffia-watch/.
86. EDWARD J. PNTO, AM. ENTER. INST., TRUTH IN GOVERNMENT LENDNG Is LONG
OVERDUE (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.aei.org/article/economics/financial-
services/housing-finance/truth-in-government-lending-is-long-overdue/.
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explicitly address how this conservative underwriting will impact minor-
ity homeownership. It seems, however, that they believe that the negative
impacts of excessively loose underwriting outweigh the gains that would
be made in the homeownership rates for African-American and Hispanic
households.
B. The Historians
The Historians have focused on the FHA's track record in African-
American communities while it implemented systemically racist policies.
They identify how the FHA's history of discrimination and neglect are
part and parcel of that track record. Implicit in this critique is that the
FHA could do better once those flaws are remedied.
The Historians' main focus on the FHA is from the 1940s through the
1960s when the gap between its service to white and black communities
was most egregious. The Historians convincingly argue that these past
discriminatory policies and practices continue to affect African-American
communities today." At the same time, the Historians also see the big
positive effect that the FHA had for white households and they argue
that the FHA can do the same for black households.
The Historians include the authors of three classics: Crabgrass Frontier
by historian Kenneth Jackson," American Apartheid: Segregation and the
Making of the Underclass by sociologists Douglas Massey and Nancy Den-
ton,8 9 and Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality
by sociologists Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro.90
After reviewing the history of FHA policies in the mid-20th century,
Jackson concluded that the "lasting damage done by the national govern-
ment was that it put its seal of approval on ethnic and racial discrimina-
tion and developed policies which had the result of the practical abandon-
ment of large sections of older, industrial cities."91 He also concludes that
the FHA's attempts to address its past practices had the opposite effect.
The shift in the 1960s to increasing mortgage credit in the urban core
had the main effect of making "it easier for white families to finance
87. Ta-Nehisi Coates makes the case that the federal government's mid-20th cen-
tury housing policies is one of the justifications for reparations for African-Americans.
The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (June 2014), available at http://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/.
88. KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER (2d ed. 2005).
89. DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
90. MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH / WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (2d ed. 2006). Many others, of course, have con-
tributed to this body of scholarship. For a recent example, see RICHARD ROTHSTEIN,
THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF How OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMER-
ICA (2017).
91. JACKSON, supra note 88, at 217.
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their escape from areas experiencing racial change."9 2 This looser credit
for black applicants also meant that home improvement companies
could buy properties at low cost, make cosmetic improvements, and sell
the renovated home at inflated prices approved by the FHA. Many of
the minority purchasers could not afford the cost of maintenance,
and the FHA had to repossess thousands of homes. The final result
was to increase the speed with which areas went through racial trans-
formation and to victimize those it was designed to help.9 3
Massey and Denton also document the separate-but-equal housing fi-
nance system for whites and blacks. They conclude that for "at least
fifty years, from 1940 through 1990, African-Americans were subject to
a system of institutionalized housing discrimination."94 And Oliver and
Shapiro note that in addition to incentivizing de facto segregation, the
FHA's actions have had a lasting impact on the wealth portfolios of
black Americans. Locked out of the greatest mass-based opportunity for
wealth accumulation in American history, African-Americans who de-
sired and were able to afford home ownership found themselves con-
signed to central city communities where their investments were affected
by the "self-fulfilling prophecies" of the FHA appraisers: cut off from
sources of new investment, their homes and communities deteriorated
and lost value in comparison to those homes and communities FHA ap-
praisers deemed desirable.9 5
The Historians document just how deeply the FHA was involved in pro-
cesses of white flight, de facto segregation, and wealth creation in white
communities as well as the lack thereof in black communities. Their work
addresses broad aspects of the FHA's operations that the Policy Scholars
just touch on. But the Historians, not being policy wonks by the nature of
their disciplines, fail to offer up much by way of solutions to the problems
created by the FHA.
C. The Middle Way
During the Great Recession, the FHA stated that its mission was to
serve borrowers that the conventional mortgage market did not serve ef-
fectively: "[flirst-time homebuyers, minorities, low-income families and
residents of underserved communities."96 More concretely, it set perfor-
mance goals of increasing homeownership opportunities and strengthen-
ing communities. For instance, to achieve these goals, the FHA set and ex-
ceeded a goal of insuring over 1.4 million single-family mortgages in fiscal
year 2009, set and exceeded a goal of having 73% of its single-family
92. Id. at 215.
93. Id.
94. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 89, at 212.
95. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 90, at 18.
96. FED. Hous. ADMIN., ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 3 (2010),
http:// www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/ffiafylOannualmanagementreport.pdf.
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mortgages go to first-time homebuyers, set and almost achieved its goal of
having 33% of its single-family mortgages go to minority households, and
set and achieved a goal of having 35% of its single-family mortgages be in
underserved communities. 97
Sadly, it does not seem that the FHA got it, even in the aftermath of the
financial crisis. By having homeownership goals drive its underwriting, it
is bound to repeat the fiscal calamities of the past. What is needed-what
all of the commentators agree upon-is for appropriate underwriting to
drive the FHA. This position is not to say that promoting homeownership
for various groups is not a legitimate goal. But rather it can do more harm
than good to the FHA itself and the homeowners it serves if it is not done
in a way that avoids frequent default and foreclosure.
A key element of appropriate underwriting is the down payment re-
quirement, as expressed in the LTV ratio. Indeed, as seen above, there
is a strong correlation between LTV and default rates over the FHA's
eighty-year history. From an underwriting perspective, a 20% down pay-
ment is great. It keeps defaults very low. But it is very hard for low- and
moderate-income families to save enough money in a reasonable amount
of time to put together a 20% down payment. The median household in-
come in 2013 was $51,939. The median house price in 2013 for existing
homes was about $198,000 at the end of 2013. It would take quite some
time for that median household to save the roughly $40,000 necessary
to have a 20% down payment on that median house. High down payment
requirements would also have a disproportionate effect on communities
of color, which tend to have lower income and less wealth than white
households. As seen above, there have been periodic pushes to decrease
down payment requirements in order to increase homeownership rates,
but those pushes have not been accompanied by an evaluation of the sus-
tainability of the increase based on such a strategy.
Advocates for low-income communities, lenders, and proponents of
an "ownership society" have all pushed for much lower down payment
requirements, particularly for first-time homeowners. This has occurred,
most notably, in the late 1960s and late 1990s, but also as veterans re-
turned from World War II. Some of these pushes are accompanied by lit-
tle thought as to the impact that low down payments have on the likeli-
hood that a household will keep its home over the long term. Others are
more thoughtful and are based on empirical research. Let us dismiss the
first set out of hand, for there have been a number of low- or no-down
payment initiatives that have been unmitigated failures.
Let us begin by addressing the criticisms of low down payment initia-
tives. The flaws with the FHA that commentators such as Van Order &
Yezer and Pinto have identified are almost completely flaws of ultra-
97. FED. Hous. ADMIN., ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 18-20
(2009), http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/ffiafy09 annualmanagementreport.pdf.
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low or no-down payment initiatives. Their prescription is to end innova-
tive homeownership programs. Instead, the focus should be on the predic-
tors of default, and in particular, the scholarly literature regarding the re-
lationship between low down payments and default. It is clear that the
FHA (and the VA) have had success with relatively small down payments
at times, as have other entities such as the Self-Help Credit Union, a mission-
driven financial institution.98
Much of the down payment literature is focused on how lowering
down payment requirements increases homeownership rates. But there
is also a substantial body of literature that indicates that no-down pay-
ment and low-down payment mortgages are much more likely to default
than mortgages with larger down payments. One article by Austin Kelly
stands out for studying mortgage default rates where the borrower has
made no down payment. It confirms what seems intuitive: "[blorrowers
who provide even modest downpayments from their own resources
have substantially lower default propensities than do borrowers whose
downpayments come from relatives, government agencies, or nonprof-
its." 99 This finding-that "skin in the game" reduces defaults-implies
that borrowers will assess the risk of purchasing a home more carefully
if their own capital is at risk and will fight harder to keep their homes
in order to protect that capital investment.
The question, of course, is what is the socially optimal level for down
payments? No one has answered this question in the context of the FHA,
but a body of research about down payments has sprung up as various
parties have attempted to influence the rulemakings that define "Quali-
fied Mortgages" (QM) and "Qualified Residential Mortgages" (QRM) pur-
suant to Dodd-Frank.
The Center for Responsible Lending, an advocate for low- and moderate-
income borrowers that also engages in serious research on lending issues,
has looked at the question of whether very low down payments are unac-
ceptably risky. It starts out by noting that "it would take the typical family
22 years to save for a 10% down payment, and 14 years for a 5% down
98. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 22 (noting that Congress lowered down
payment to 3% in some cases in the 1950s); UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, SETTING THE
RECOmD STRAIGHT ON HOMEOWNERSHIP 1-4 (Policy Brief, undated), http://ccc.sites.unc.
edu/ files/2013/02/Setting-Record-StraightHO.pdf (studying Self Help Credit
Union Community Advantage Program portfolio of 46,000 home-purchase
mortgages over a ten year period); Roberto G. Quercia et al., Regaining the Dream:
How to Renew the Promise of Homeownership for America's Working Families
26-33 (2011) (discussing the success of the Self-Help Community Advantage
Program).
99. Austin Kelly, "Skin in the Game": Zero Downpayment Mortgage Default, 17 J.
Hous. RES. 75, 75 (2008).
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payment."" In a study of its affiliate-lender's record of borrower defaults,
researchers found that "72% of borrowers made a down payment of less
than 5 percent," but they were delinquent less than a quarter of the rate
of subprime ARM borrowers.101
Some evidence exists that there is a down payment sweet spot of
around 5% at which default rates are within an acceptable range.1 0 2 The
Coalition for a Sensible Housing Policy, a coalition of lenders and con-
sumer advocates, argues that:
once you apply the strong underwriting standards in the sample QRM
definition, moving from a 5 percent to a 10 percent down payment re-
quirement reduces the overall default experience by an average of only
two- to three-tenths of one percent for each cohort year. However, the in-
crease in the minimum down payment from 5 percent to 10 percent would
eliminate from 4 to 7 percent of borrowers from qualifying for a lower rate
QRM loan.103
The higher requirements would also have a strongly disproportionate
effect on communities of color.
Quercia et al. have looked at the trade-offs between safe underwriting
and access to credit in the context of the QRM rules.104 They have also de-
veloped a useful metric, which they refer to as a "benefit ratio." The ben-
efit ratio compares "the percent reduction in the number of defaults to the
percent reduction in the number of borrowers who would have access to
QRM mortgages."105 A metric of this sort would go a long way to ensur-
ing that there is transparency for both homeowners and policymakers as
to the likelihood that homeowners can pay their mortgages and keep their
homes.
They would push the optimal down payment size even lower, arguing
that "LTVs of 97 percent result in a better benefit ratio, suggesting that a
small down payment requirement may have an important protective ef-
fect against default risk while still providing broad access to mortgage
credit."106 They conclude that "restricting the origination of risky loan
100. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, GOVERNMENT-MANDATED DowN PAYMENT STAN-
DARDS WOULD HARM THE EcONOvY, DENY HOMEOWNERSHIP TO CREDIT-WORTHY FAMILIES 1
(2013), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/
congress/ CRL-Down-Payment-Mandates-Would-Harm-the-Economy-Credit-
Worthy-Families-A ugust-13-2013.pdf (emphasis omitted).
101. QUERCIA ET AL., supra note 71, at 1.
102. See COAL. FOR SENSIBLE Hous. POLICY, PROPOSED QUALIFIED RESIDENTIAL MORT-
GAGE DEFINITION HARMS CREDITWORTHY BORROWERS WHILE FRUSTRATING HOUSING RECOV-
ERY 6 (2011), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-
legislation/regulators/C oalition-QRM-White-Paper-1.pdf.
103. Id.
104. QUERCIA ET AL., suprT note 71, at 20.
105. Id. (emphasis omitted).
106. Id. at 33.
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features and underwriting a loan with a consideration of a borrower's
ability to repay has the largest benefit in terms of reducing default risk
without limiting access to credit."o7
The goal of ensuring that borrowers do not default in high numbers is
less of a constant than one might suppose. The policy of the FHA was
surely to err on the side of low defaults from the 1930s through the
1950s. But starting in the 1960s, this approach was relaxed, and at times
it was implicitly rejected or ignored. This relaxation of standards was
seen with the Section 235 fiasco of the 1970s as well as the American
Dream Downpayment Act debacle of the 2000s. It appears that house-
holds and communities of color are most harmed by such thoughtlessly
loose underwriting criteria because they were disproportionately repre-
sented among homeowners impacted by the defaults and foreclosures
from those failed programs.
History teaches us that the goal of sustainable homeownership should
not have been ignored. It should be pursued for the sake of the FHA's vi-
ability. It should also be pursued to for the sake of FHA-insured borrowers
who should be able to rely on FHA underwriting as a signal that they will
likely be able to afford their housing payments and keep their homes.10
There will always be some percentage of FHA mortgagors who will de-
fault on their loans. The key policy question is what the acceptable range
of default should be over the long term. If the rate is too low, it would
imply that some were not given the opportunity to benefit from home-
ownership. If the rate is too high, it would likely imply that an FHA mort-
gage was reducing household net worth and having too many negative
social impacts on households as families deal with the effects of default,
foreclosure, and eviction.
There is no objective way to identify the most ideal default rate for
FHA mortgages. One might, however, look at the alternatives available
to households. Because FHA-eligible households have the option of rent-
ing, the benefits and drawbacks of an FHA mortgage to a household
should be compared to renting as well as to other mortgage products
that might be available to them. Researchers at the UNC Center for Com-
munity Capital argue that homeownership beats renting in a number of
ways, although their study is drawn from a very limited number of home-
owners with mortgages from a particular loan program, the Community
Advantage Program (CAP). 109
107. Id. at 4.
108. See Andrew Caplin et al., Is the FHA Creating Sustainable Homeownership?, 43
REAL EST. EcoN. 957 (2015) (finding high delinquency rates for "the 2007-2009 vin-
tages of FHA borrowers" with negative implications for the FHA and the borrow-
ers alike).
109. UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, supra note 95, at 1-4 (Policy Brief, undated),
http://ccc.sites.unc.edu/ files/2013/02/Setting-Record-StraightHO.pdf (studying
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The UNC researchers found that ownership provides a greater finan-
cial cushion than renting for low-income families. Most important for
our purposes, they found that the loans in their study were "notable for
their high loan-to-value ratios: 97 percent is the typical maximum loan-
to-value ratio, though some programs issue loans all the way up to 103
percent of house value."110 They concluded that "having received assis-
tance toward one's down payment and closing costs has no significant ef-
fect whatsoever on CAP homeowners' mortgage performance."' The au-
thors of the study noted some "important caveats" in their findings that
severely limit their generalizability.1 1 2
I am cautious of assuming that the FHA's results with low down pay-
ments would be the same as CAP's given the significant differences be-
tween the two programs. But CAP's results do, at least, suggest that we
do not yet know how low down payments can go while still maintaining
an acceptable level of mortgage defaults.
Combining the UNC study with the benefit ratio of Quercia et al. (also
affiliated with UNC) discussed above, we can reasonably identify a range
of 3% to 5% down payments as a starting point for FHA underwriting and
assume that future performance data could push that range lower over
time. We can also imagine that a more sophisticated underwriting process
could allow for trade-offs among LTV, credit score, and debt-to-income
(DTI) that could push that range even lower for select borrowers.
This all seems straightforward enough, but there has been a long his-
tory of politicizing mortgage underwriting in federal programs. Congress
has shown itself to put politics ahead of responsible underwriting to dis-
astrous effect. The commentators who have lost faith in the FHA's ability
to stay the course of responsible underwriting thus have good reasons.
But given the long history of the FHA, it seems they are, perhaps, too
pessimistic. Indeed, their aversion to policy experimentation by the
FHA is consistent with a broader aversion to government social policy
Self Help Credit Union Community Advantage Program portfolio of 46,000 home-
purchase mortgages over a ten-year period).
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id. at 4.
112. Id. ("First, not all owners fared equally well. Some owners who bought late
in the cycle in more volatile markets have lost wealth. Second, the experience of the
CAP homeowners cannot be generalized to all lower-income borrowers over this
same period because the type of financing used is a key determinant of the finan-
cial trajectory of investing in a home. All of the owners in the CAP portfolio re-
ceived fixed-rate, fixed-payment, standardized, competitively priced, long-term
mortgages. It is largely due to the durability of their affordable mortgages that
CAP's owners have enjoyed the benefits traditionally associated with homeowner-
ship, even against a backdrop of economic upheaval. Borrowers who used costlier,
riskier products were not as fortunate and many have lost their homes as a
result.").
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expenditures, an aversion that reverberates in just about every federal
election throughout the country in recent years. All social policy can be
done irresponsibly. All of it can lose or waste money or have unintended
consequences. In my eyes, though, there is nothing about the FHA that is
particularly flawed as an instrument of government action.
This is not to say that we have nothing to learn from the FHA's critics.
The FHA should be constrained from repeating the errors of its past. Con-
gress could commit itself to a strong underwriting standard by returning
to the "economic soundness" standard of the pre-1950s FHA.
Congress could also mandate that the FHA implement an appropriate
benefit ratio through a rulemaking process. The rulemaking would protect
the FHA from loose underwriting. There is, of course, always the risk that
Congress would reverse itself, but-hey-that's democracy.
And if Congress finds that there are categories of households that are
still not adequately accessing the mortgage markets, it would need to in-
crease the cross-subsidy elements of the FHA insurance premium or allo-
cate funds to subsidize them directly. Although increasing direct subsidies
through congressional action may be infeasible in the current political envi-
ronment, increasing cross-subsidies may be done administratively.
The more sophisticated approach to underwriting, which looks at the
layering of risks such as credit score, loan-to-value ratio, debt-to-income
ratio, and other factors, may-in theory-result in a more socially optimal
level of lending. Our worries do not disappear, however, merely because
we undertake a rulemaking initiative that implements a dynamic under-
writing standard.
Notwithstanding all of the benefits of a dynamic approach, a measured
political analysis might suggest that there is good reason to stick with an
easy-to-understand heuristic like a mandatory 3% to 5% down payment
requirement. Such a requirement, in contrast to the dynamic rule,
would be harder for homeowners, lenders, and politicians seeking to be
"pro-homeowner" to manipulate. That dynamic rule is always going to
be subject to pressures from lenders looking to increase market share
and politicians who put pressure on regulated financial institutions to ex-
pand access to credit for a variety of politically expedient reasons.
IV. Conclusion
The FHA has been a versatile tool of government since it was created in
the 1930s, achieving a variety of social purposes through its mortgage in-
surance programs. However, it can stumble when the goals to which it is
put are muddled. There is no doubt that today's FHA suffered from many
of the same unrealistic underwriting assumptions that have derailed so
many subprime lenders, as well as Fannie and Freddie. It had also been
harmed, like other lenders, by a housing market as bad as any seen
since the Great Depression.
The Policy Scholars have rightly brought attention to the risks of FHA
programs that fail to underwrite its products appropriately. They are right
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that the FHA needed to be bailed out because of this failed underwriting
practice. They have therefore concluded that the FHA is not particularly
good at achieving its social policy objectives. They call for a more limited
role for the FHA, one that focuses on liquidity and stability and leaves in-
novative approaches to expanding homeownership behind.
The Policy Scholars do not, however, fully appreciate the extent to
which modest down payment requirements and responsible underwriting
can drive the success of new FHA initiatives. Central to any analysis of the
FHA's role is an understanding of its policies relating to down payment
size. Much of the FHA's performance is driven by its down payment re-
quirements, which have trended ever downward so that homeowners
were able at times to get loans for 100% of the value of the house in recent
years. But as is obvious to all, the larger the down payment, the safer the
loan, if everything else is equal.
What has been less obvious to policy makers is that tiny or nonexistent
down payments are unacceptably risky. Given that the FHA insures 100%
of the losses on its mortgages, the down payment requirement is a key dri-
ver of its performance. Empirical researchers should continue to study how
low down payment requirements can go while still maintaining an accept-
able benefit ratio for FHA mortgages. At this point, a down payment in the
range of 3% to 5% seems appropriate, but one could contemplate that num-
ber being responsibly pushed lower over time, within a rulemaking con-
text. One could also contemplate a sophisticated approach that might
allow for lower down payments for those with stronger credit histories
or other strengths in their underwriting profiles. This approach would re-
quire an underwriting system that was relatively insulated from politics.
It seems too simple to conclude by saying that although it is important
to make residential credit broadly available, the FHA will not be doing
borrowers any favors if their loans are not sustainable and they end up
in default or foreclosure. But simply put, in the past the FHA has not al-
ways balanced the goal of access to credit with the goal of sustainable
credit. It should, however, plan on always keeping that balance in mind
going forward. In that way, it can make homeownership available to
households who could reasonably expect to maintain it over the long
term. This is true for all FHA borrowers, but particularly true for African-
American households that have been disproportionately hurt by FHA un-
derwriting practices over its eighty-year history.
The FHA can be used to make homeownership more accessible gener-
ally and for African-American homeowners in particular.
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